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INTRODUCTION
A perusal of The Times on January 18, 2010 would suggest
to the reader that pre-packaged administration (“pre-
pack”) is not a universally popular mechanism. Lord
Kirkham the chairman of DFS is quoted as saying: 
“These shameful devices give badly managed businesses a huge
cost advantage … I cannot get my head around why such
incompetence should be rewarded at the expense of successful
companies.”  
Bertrand des Pallieres in the context of the Hellas
Telecommunications transfer of its centre of main interest
to the UK and subsequent pre-pack administration made
the following comment: 
“If nothing is done, London will become a bankruptcy brothel
for low-life businesses to come from all over and take
advantage of the British system to dump some of their debts
and move on.”  
Yet practitioners who operate pre-packs are keen to explain
their positive characteristics. Peter Sargent, the president
of R3 (Association of Business Recovery Professionals),
states: 
“Pre-packs are a very misunderstood insolvency tool, and the
benefits – for example, the numbers of jobs saved – are often
lost in concerns over the impact on unsecured creditors.”
The purpose of this article is to consider in outline what all
the fuss is about and to consider recent legal developments
in the area. It will consider in particular whether the
reactions of the regulator and profession have gone far
enough to counter fully the criticisms levelled at pre-packs.
What is a pre-pack?
In its guidance to the insolvency practitioner profession,
R3 (in the text of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16
(“SIP 16”)) defines a pre-pack as:
“An arrangement under which the sale of all or part of a
company’s business or assets is negotiated with a purchaser
prior to the appointment of an administrator, and the
administrator effects the sale immediately on, or shortly after,
his appointment.”
The pre-pack is a process which is not mentioned
anywhere in the Insolvency Act 1986 (“the Act”).
According to the Act, administration is a process under
which an administrator is appointed with various statutory
purposes in mind (Sched B1, para 3). Upon appointment
the administrator should initially consider whether or not
rescuing the company as a distinct entity is feasible. Only if
this is not reasonably practicable should the administrator
then consider acting with the objective of achieving a better
result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would
be achieved in an immediate winding up. If this is not
possible the administrator should act to realise property in
order to make a distribution to one or more secured or
preferential creditors. If either of the first two statutory
purposes is pursued, the administrator must act in the
interests of the creditors as a whole. If the third statutory
purpose is pursued the administrator must act in a way
which does not unnecessarily harm the interests of the
creditors.
According to the provisions of Schedule B1 of the Act, the
administrator must generally put a proposal, aimed at
achieving the statutory purpose, to the creditors. If the
proposal is approved by the creditors it is then carried out.
Of course, with a pre-pack none of this happens (at least
not before the company’s business has been sold on). The
absence of any statutory authority for pre-packs is one
significant cause for concern.
MAIN CRITICISMS OF PRE-PACKS
There has been much said and written both in legal
journals and in the general media on the mechanics and
consequences of pre-packs. The courts have recognised the
general unease surrounding them. His Honour Judge
Cooke made the following statement in Re Kayley Vending
Limited [2009] BCC 578 at 583:
“A general summary of these concerns would be that the speed
and secrecy which give rise to the advantages claimed for pre-
packs may too easily lead the directors and the insolvency
practitioner to arrive at a solution which is convenient for
both of them and their interests (perhaps also satisfying a
secured creditor who might be in a position to appoint his
own receiver or administrator), but which harms the interests
of the general creditors because:
(i) it may not achieve the best price for the assets; 
(ii) credit may be incurred inappropriately in the pre-
appointment period; 
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(iii) they are deprived of the opportunity to influence the
transaction before it takes place; and 
(iv) having been presented with a fait accompli, they have
insufficient information to make it worthwhile
investigating and challenging the decisions taken.” 
Steps taken to allay these criticisms
The regulator (the Insolvency Service) and the profession
(in the form of the insolvency practitioner professional
bodies) have reacted to these concerns by making the
process more transparent with the introduction of quite
rigorous information-giving requirements found in SIP 16
(in force January 1, 2009). SIP 16 requires that where a
pre-pack has occurred, the administrator must make
certain information available to the company’s creditors.
The administrator must, inter alia, provide the following
information: how the administrator came to be involved,
the extent of his or her involvement prior to appointment,
a full explanation of any attempt to market the business,
any valuations, alternative courses of action which were
considered, why a pre-pack was decided upon, whether
major creditors were consulted, and full details of the sale
including the price and the identity of the buyer.
A report on the first six months’ operation of SIP 16 (“the
Report”) drafted by the Insolvency Service has provided
useful information on how common pre-packs are, the
characteristics of a typical pre-pack and areas where the
profession could improve its compliance rate. The
Insolvency Service is continuing to monitor the operation
of SIP 16 and is carrying out a consultation with the
profession as to how the terms of SIP 16 can be improved.
The Report covers information received in relation to 572
companies in administration. As there is no statutory or
regulatory requirement for insolvency practitioners to send
SIP 16 information to the Insolvency Service, the actual
number of pre-packs during the six month period in
question could be between 10 and 20 per cent higher. It
seems that between one in four and one in three
administrations are pre-packs. The Report found that 370
of the 572 administrations complied with SIP 16 which
represents a compliance rate of about 65 per cent. The
Report found that 81 per cent of pre-pack sales were to
parties connected with the insolvent company. The
Insolvency Service has written to 180 insolvency
practitioners in relation to the 202 non-compliant pre-
packs and referred 29 insolvency practitioners to their
respective professional bodies.
The most common and most significant areas of non-
compliance are highlighted by the Report. In a majority of
cases where a valuation of the business had been obtained
prior to the pre-pack, insolvency practitioners did not
disclose the amounts attributed to either the business as a
whole, or to individual classes of asset. In a large minority
of cases, no valuations appear to have been sought in
relation to certain assets that were subsequently sold for a
relatively substantial amount. In a small minority of cases,
no effort was made to identify the individuals involved with
a purchasing corporate entity. 
The Report suggests that there is no initial evidence to
suggest that the level of director misconduct in pre-packs
(at least those reported under SIP 16 to the Insolvency
Service) is any greater than the overall level of misconduct
reported by insolvency practitioners generally. Despite this
initial finding, it may be too early to dismiss the common
complaint that companies are sometimes “fattened up”
prior to a pre-pack by inappropriate incurring of credit. It
may be that such behaviour is more prevalent in pre-packs
where no SIP 16 returns have been made to the Insolvency
Service. Compulsory filing of SIP 16 reports to the
Insolvency Service may lead to greater confidence in the
policing of director misconduct.
COURT’S BLESSING?
An important issue which has been considered in recent
times is whether or not the court can be seen as giving its
blessing to a pre-pack when making an administration
order where the applicants are planning a pre-pack. This is
atypical, as the vast majority of pre-packs involve an
appointment made out of court. In Re Kayley Vending Limited
[2009] BCC 578 the court made an administration order.
The evidence presented to the court suggested a reasonable
prospect of achieving a better result for the creditors than
would be achieved on an immediate winding up (the
second statutory purpose). The court emphasised that part
of its function was to ensure that the procedure was not
being obviously abused to the disadvantage of the creditors.
If this was the case the court might conclude that it was
inappropriate to give the pre-pack the apparent blessing
conferred by making the order. The court would look to be
provided with the same information required by SIP16 to
explain how and why the pre-pack should happen.
The result of Kayley suggests that if an administration order
is made in circumstances where a pre-pack is intended, the
granting of the order would act as a significant protection
for the administrator were the company’s creditors to
mount a subsequent attack on the pre-pack and/or the
administrator personally. The apparent blessing of the
court would be an enormous comfort for the
administrator. The consequence of this would suggest that
such an order affords the administrator protection from
creditor action akin to a kind of legal “bomb shelter”
(something the courts have shied away from in a similar
context in Re T&D Industries [2000] BCC 956).
This point was further explored in Re Hellas
Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA [2009] EWHC 3199
(Ch). The court considered two controversial issues. The
first involved the court agreeing that the company had
successfully moved its centre of main interest to England
for the purposes of the EC Regulation on Insolvency
Proceedings (1346/2000). The second required 5
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consideration of an application for an administration order
where a pre-pack was intended. The court, consistently
with Kayley, decided that in order to consider the matter it
would need to see the information which would be
required under SIP 16. On the facts the court made the
order. There was no real alternative to the pre-pack deal. 
In the course of a short judgment, Lewison J observed: “It
is not entirely easy to see precisely where in the statutory
structure the court is concerned with the merits of the
pre-pack sale.” There are no provisions in the Act dealing
with any matter specific to pre-packs so it is no surprise
there is no guidance on how to consider an application for
an administration order where a pre-pack is intended. 
His Lordship appears wary of allowing the court to be used
as a shield from creditor discontent and laid down that the
general rule will be that the merits of the deal are
something with which the administrator has to deal.
Aggrieved creditors will still be able to challenge the
decision of the administrator even where the court has
made the order. His Lordship identified three possibilities
when the court is faced with an application for an
administration order with a pre-pack in mind:
1. It may be obvious that the proposed pre-pack is an
abuse of the administrator’s powers. In such
circumstances the court could refuse to make the order
or direct the administrator not to complete the pre-
pack sale;
2. It may be obvious that the pre-pack is the only real way
forward. The court could make the order but an
aggrieved creditor could still complain (this was the
court’s view of the application in question);
3. In the majority of cases the position may not be clear.
In such a case the making of the administration order
should not be taken as giving the court’s blessing to the
pre-pack sale.
It is quite clear from this that the courts will usually refuse
to take part in providing any great comfort to the pre-pack
administrator. At either end of the spectrum it may
intervene or give a clear indication of its view. It may be
that the proposed pre-pack is a clear abuse of process or at
the other end it may be that it is the only feasible possibility
available to the company. In the majority of cases, even
where the court makes the order, the administrator will be
left alone to defend the decision to pre-pack if the decision
is attacked by creditors. The order will not therefore
usually constitute a “bomb shelter” for the pre-pack
administrator to hide in.
PRE-APPOINTMENT FEES
One significant issue in relation to pre-packs which has
been bubbling under the surface for several years is the
matter of how the pre-pack administrator gets paid for all
the pre-appointment work. The issue is largely resolved by
the recent amendments to the Insolvency Rules (SI
1986/1925 – amendments in force April 6, 2010) but
possibly not in a way which will encourage discontented
unsecured creditors. 
In the summer of 2007, the Insolvency Service carried out
a limited survey of insolvency practitioners requesting
information on how they were being paid for their pre-
appointment work. The evidence suggested that some
practitioners relied upon Insolvency Rule 2.67(1)(c)
(which appears to limit a claim for expenses to the costs of
putting into effect the formal mechanism for applying for
an administration order); some distressed companies spent
company funds on pre-appointment fees at a time when it
is apparent the company was insolvent; some were paid out
under a form of indemnity provided by the holder of a
qualifying floating charge; some practitioners, who could
not recover their pre-appointment expenses in full, took
this factor into account when setting their fees for post-
appointment work.
The issue as to whether or not pre-appointment fees could
count as an administration expense was considered as an
additional issue in Kayley. On the facts the court ordered
that the pre-appointment fees should be treated as an
expense of the administration under the discretionary
power found in paragraph 13 of Schedule B1 of the Act.
This power could only be exercised where the company
entered the pre-pack administration by way of an
administration order. The court made the point that pre-
appointment costs would not automatically be regarded as
administration expenses under Insolvency Rule 2.67.
The discretion under para 13 would only be exercised by the
court where it is satisfied that the balance of benefit arising
from the incurring of pre-appointment costs is in favour of
the creditors rather than the management of the company as
potential purchasers of the business. On the facts the pre-
pack sale was being made to an outsider third party not to
anyone connected to the management of the company.
There appear to be two main consequences of the decision,
in relation to expenses, for the typical out-of-court pre-
pack where the company’s management buys the business.
The first is that administrators cannot automatically claim
the costs leading to their appointment as expenses under
Rule 2.67. If it is the company who initially instructs them,
the costs will remain as unsecured debt in the
administration. If the directors or secured creditor are the
instructing client, the administrator must look to them for
payment. The second consequence is that if the pre-pack
involves a sale to the company’s management team, the
pre-appointment costs cannot constitute an expense of the
administration. This would be the case whether the
appointment was made out-of-court or by the court.  
Amendments in relation to payment of pre-
appointment fees
Changes in force on April 6, 2010 amend Insolvency Rules
2.33 and 2.67. The above analysis of pre-appointment fees
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will therefore only apply to pre-packs carried out prior to
this date. The effect of the new regime is broadly that
administrators will be able to claim their pre-appointment
fees as administration expenses but only if they obtain the
consent of the company’s creditors. This looks, at first
blush, to give the creditors the whip hand but as will be
seen below, this newly bestowed power may be illusory in
almost all pre-packs.
Under the new rules, pre-appointment fees will qualify as
expenses if (i) they are contained within the proposal
provided to creditors and (ii) they are subsequently
approved by:
1. The creditors’ committee – if none exists or its
approval is withheld, then the power to approve the
costs is exercised by:
2. A resolution of the creditors – unless para 52(1)(b)
applies in which case;
3. Each secured creditor must approve the fees (and at
least 50% of preferential creditors voting where a
payment is to be made to preferential creditors).
4. If no approval is given under these provisions or if the
amount approved is regarded as insufficient by the
administrator, he or she may apply to the court for
determination.
The likely consequence of these new rules in the majority
of pre-packs is that:
1. In a pre-pack it is highly unlikely that a creditors’
committee will exist; 
2. As only about 1 per cent of unsecured debt is ever
recovered in pre-packs (according to the Sixth Report
of the House of Commons Business and Enterprise
Select Committee – HC198), it is very unlikely that any
payment to unsecured creditors will occur. In such
circumstances paragraph 52(1)(b) will apply and so the
unsecured creditors will not get to vote on the pre-
appointment costs;
3. It will therefore nearly always be the secured creditors
who get to make the decision on the pre-appointment
fees (with the possible caveat that not all preferential
creditors have been paid although as any preferential
debt will nearly always consist of limited claims of
employees and they are likely to have been paid in full
prior to the administration this class of creditor is again
unlikely to exist to any great extent).
4. Due to the above it is unlikely that the court will be
called upon for its adjudication.
It is therefore conceivable that in nearly all pre-packs, the
decision to approve the pre-appointment fees of the
administrator will fall to be made by the secured creditors.
It is clear that the pre-pack itself is unlikely to be feasible
if it does not already have the support of secured creditors
and so the agreement to the pre-appointment fees
constituting expenses of the administration is likely to be a
straightforward matter for the administrator. If this
analysis is correct the approval of fees in this way is likely
to exacerbate feelings that unsecured creditors are
disenfranchised.
Two problems may be identified from the Rules. First, the
court has recognised in the context of employment
protection legislation that a pre-pack administration is an
insolvency proceeding instituted with a view to the
liquidation of the assets (Oakland v Wellswood [2009] IRLR
250). In an “expenses” context the courts have recognised
a close correlation between expenses in administration
with expenses in liquidation (Goldacre v Nortel Networks
[2009] EWHC 3389 (Ch)). It is arguable therefore that it
would be more logical to use the precedent for approval of
liquidators’ remuneration rather than invent a new scheme
specifically for pre-packs. This would give the unsecured
creditors the right to fix remuneration (or the creditors’
committee if there is one). The decision would not be
dominated by the wishes of the secured creditors. 
Second, under the new Insolvency Rules for pre-pack
administration expenses, it is unlikely but still possible that
the court will be called upon to approve the remuneration.
The court has stated in Re Kayley that it would not approve
pre-pack fees as expenses unless it is satisfied that the
balance of benefit arising from incurring pre-appointment
costs is in favour of the creditors rather than the
management of the company as potential purchasers of the
business. In a typical management buy-out pre-pack it
seems the court will not approve the pre-pack fees as an
expense. The new Rules would therefore appear to be out
of step with judicial assessment of such fees.
PROBLEMS OF CONFLICTS OF DUTY
The decision in Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd v Smailes
[2009] B.C.C. 810 involved a pre-pack administration sale
of a solicitors’ practice which had practised as an LLP. The
court ordered the removal of the administrators and the
appointment of replacement administrators. A majority of
the creditors supported this move. The court expressly
stated that there was no imputation against the integrity of
the administrators who were removed. The principal issue
was that on the evidence available to the court, there was a
significant issue raised by the majority of creditors as to
whether or not the sale of the business was at a significant
undervalue. The administrators do not appear to have fully
complied with SIP 16 in terms of providing full
information about the sale. A further issue involved the
terms upon which the main participator in the LLP was
subsequently employed by the purchaser. Although not a
typical management buy-out pre-pack, the main
participator in the LLP was subsequently employed by the
purchaser on attractive terms. 
The court found that the terms of the pre-pack sale
constituted a legitimate matter for an independent review.
The review required an independent administrator to be
appointed. The court considered the alternative of a
creditors’ voluntary liquidation with an independent
insolvency practitioner acting as a liquidator but appears to
have been swayed by the consequential delay this option
would cause and also the majority creditors’ wish for a
replacement administrator.
One obvious question to ask is: would full compliance with
SIP 16 have avoided this result? The answer is not entirely
clear. It seems arguable that if full disclosure of all the pre-
appointment negotiations and terms of the sale had been
given to the LLP’s creditors, there may not have been any
need for the independent review and by definition no need
to replace the administrators. Even if fuller details had been
provided to the creditors, the appointment of an
independent insolvency practitioner may still have been seen
as necessary by the court if there was still a substantial issue
as to whether or not the sale had been at an undervalue. 
A view recently expressed by the Association of British
Insurers suggests that creditors perceive a lack of
independence in management buy-out pre-packs: “We do
not believe that insolvency practitioners can fully and
properly discharge their duty to act independently in the
interests of creditors, when they have already been engaged
by the distressed company to achieve a pre-agreed
outcome (particularly where that outcome is a sale of parts
of the business to the existing owners).” 
Creditor discontent with pre-packs is unlikely to disappear
even where SIP16 is fully satisfied. The provision of
detailed information about the lead-up to the pre-pack,
valuations, identity of purchasers and the involvement of
the insolvency practitioner (under the new rules in relation
to remuneration) may provoke more creditor discontent
rather than less. The fuller information provided may
actually increase the incidence of creditors applying to the
courts for an independent review of the deal.
CREDITORS DISENFRANCHISED FROM
DECISION MAKING
The Cork Committee (Cmnd 8558, 1982), whose views
might be regarded as a little “old hat” by some nowadays,
identified a number of characteristics essential to
insolvency regulation. In particular, (at para 917) the
Committee was: “in no doubt that the machinery should
be such as to allow, and indeed encourage, those creditors
who have a genuine interest to involve themselves in all
types of insolvent administration.”  The problem with the
pre-1986 regime was that creditors were often excluded
from decision making. It is a hallmark of a sound
insolvency legal system that it encourages creditor
participation. It is clear that pre-packs do the exact
opposite of this. The express statutory right to vote on an
administrator’s proposal is usurped and replaced by a non-
statutory entitlement under SIP 16 to receive historical
information.
IS SIP 16 THE SOLUTION TO ALL THESE
PROBLEMS? 
The House of Commons Business and Enterprise Select
Committee examined the widespread concerns over pre-
packs and recognised that SIP16 was a “first step” in
addressing creditors’ concerns. This suggests that the
balance is not yet right. It is likely that SIP 16 will continue
to develop and indeed the Insolvency Service is currently
surveying the profession to see how it can be improved.
Assuming that pre-packs are here to stay – what else is
needed? 
Looking at the main complaints levelled at pre-packs and
assuming full compliance with SIP 16, the following points
may be made. SIP 16 deals with the provision of
information about how and why the pre-pack was entered.
Compliance with SIP 16 would therefore permit creditors
to assess whether or not the best price for the company’s
assets has been achieved. SIP 16 may develop to allow the
Insolvency Service to continue to police allegations that
credit has been incurred inappropriately in the pre-
appointment period. So far, so good.
SIP 16 does not deal with creditors’ inability to influence
the decision to pre-pack, although through the provision of
information, it may assist creditors in deciding whether or
not to bring an action against the pre-pack administrator.
SIP 16 (and the new rules on expenses) do not prevent
creditors feeling that the result benefits the administrator
and the participators in the company (at least where there
is a connected sale) at the expense of the unsecured
creditors. 
The Cork Committee stated (at para 191) that the basic
objective of insolvency law is “to support the maintenance of
commercial morality and encourage the fulfilment of
financial obligations.” If such a basic objective is to be
achieved, “it is essential that proper investigation will be
made in every case in which it is warranted” (para 194). The
perception that no truly independent insolvency practitioner
gets to investigate the pre-pack and the events leading up to
it remains a complaint not addressed by SIP 16.
CONCLUSION
The overwhelming criticism of pre-packs made by
unsecured creditors is that they have no say in the decision
to pre-pack and have nobody looking out for their
interests. Despite the statutory duty on administrators to
act in the interests of the creditors as a whole (or at least
not to act in a way which unnecessarily harms their
interests), unsecured creditors remain unconvinced. The
way a pre-pack often operates looks very much like an old-
style administrative receivership (where the receiver owes a
primary duty to the appointing debenture holder).
Whether or not this is a valid criticism of the way some
pre-packs are carried out, the perception is established.
This perceived lack of objectivity is arguably the biggest
problem with pre-packs.8
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The courts have shown an understandable reluctance to
“rubber stamp” proposed pre-pack deals and it would be
unrealistic to require the court to assess each and every
out-of-court administration. The question therefore moves
on to whether or not it would be feasible to build into the
pre-pack procedure a requirement for some independent
assessment by a different insolvency practitioner. 
The obvious solution to this concern would be to follow
the lead given by the court in Clydesdale. If no-one is
perceived to be looking out for the interests of unsecured
creditors, why not introduce the requirement of an
independent review into the pre-pack mechanism? This
may be seen as only necessary where there is a
management buy-out pre-pack but could be used in all
pre-packs. Unsecured creditors should feel significant
comfort if an independent insolvency practitioner is
appointed to assess the pre-pack and its surrounding
circumstances.
Two possibilities may be considered. First, it may be
possible to require the appointment of an independent
insolvency practitioner prior to execution of the deal
whose consent is necessary before the pre-pack can be
executed. This would prevent inappropriate pre-packs
being executed. 
A second option would be to require some after-the-event
inspection of the pre-pack. This could be achieved by
requiring that following the pre-pack the company would
need to enter a creditors’ voluntary liquidation with an
independent liquidator charged with reviewing the pre-
pack. Creditors would have some say in the liquidation
even if they had no say in the pre-pack. Creditors’ interests
would be considered by someone who ostensibly is acting
in their interests and seen to be so doing.
The obvious problem with either solution is that they
would both cost money. Both would require money being
set aside to pay the costs and expenses of the independent
insolvency practitioner. Unsecured creditors may baulk at
the suggestion that two insolvency practitioners should be
paid to deal with the one insolvent company. This is a
reasonable concern but not much different to what
happens when a liquidation follows on from a receivership
(where an independent liquidator must be appointed). The
unsecured creditors, who are unlikely to see much if any of
their money anyway, may see the positive side of such a
system. They might argue that it is their money which is
being used to pay for the pre-pack as things stand. If
money had to be set aside to pay the costs of an
independent insolvency practitioner, such a requirement is
unlikely to affect greatly any final dividend payable to
unsecured creditors. 
If independent scrutiny became the norm, it may be that
the incidence of pre-packs will reduce. Secured lenders,
pre-pack administrators and management teams would
perhaps be more cautious about entering into such an
arrangement. 
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